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Everyday lookism, by which I mean the widespread practice of commenting upon and 
judging the appearance of others, is often regarded as morally troubling. But when, 
and why, is it morally problematic? I argue that in many cases everyday lookism is 
wrongful because it involves morally objectionable appearance discrimination. I 
consider various respects in which everyday lookism can be morally objectionable in 
virtue of the acts of wrongful discrimination it involves. I argue that these acts are 
wrongful when they are demeaning, or when they have unjust consequences whether 
singly or cumulatively. There are a number of ways in which they may have unjust 
consequences. First, the appearance norms in which these acts are rooted may be 
biased in such a way that the acts contribute to creating an unjust distribution of 
benefits and burdens. Second, these acts may combine to make everyday lookism 
oppressive in virtue of impairing the personal autonomy of its victims or contributing 
to doing so. Third, these acts may be unjustly harmful in terms of their effects. 
Key words 





Everyday lookism, by which I mean the widespread practice of commenting upon and 
judging the appearance of others, is often regarded as morally troubling.1 It occurs in 
various contexts, including on social media where it is commonplace to make  
remarks about the appearance of others. It is fuelled by demanding appearance norms 
that spell out the standards that need to be met to be presentable to others and to look 
beautiful. Heather Widdows documents the way in which exacting norms relating to 
youthfulness, slimness, absence of body hair, skin texture, and firmness of flesh 
govern the appearance of women, and she illustrates the way in which increasingly 
men too are subject to norms that are comparable in terms of their demandingness 
(Widdows, 2018: 19-26, 54-60, 236-243).  
In Widdows’s view, these appearance norms have come to form an ethical 
ideal that exerts pressure not only on people who accept it but also those who reject 
it.2 Even though this ideal can be combined with a range of different conceptions of 
what gives value and meaning to our lives (for example, it is perfectly consistent with 
valuing artistic creativity or enjoying wilderness adventures), when a person endorses 
it, then it shapes and constrains her conception of how to live. Those who don’t 
comply with the relevant norms, irrespective of whether they endorse them, are 
subject to disapproval of a kind that is not merely aesthetic but takes the form of 
ethical or moral criticism. Women especially are often subjected to criticism that is 
ethical or moral in tone for not making the best of themselves, or for letting 
themselves go, in a way that implies they have failed in their duty to themselves, and 
perhaps even to others, to take care of their appearance. Furthermore, both men and 
women (and indeed boys and girls) are shamed for being overweight, and are 
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regarded as self-indulgent or lacking in self-control for failing to achieve what may be 
for them an unattainable standard of thinness.  
 Widdows’s account of the ideal of beauty that fuels everyday lookism is 
illuminating. But when, and why, is everyday lookism morally problematic? I hope to 
cast some light on this issue. I argue that in many cases everyday lookism is wrongful 
because it involves morally objectionable discrimination. This might seem to over-
stretch the concept of discrimination – we don’t immediately think of this practice as 
discriminatory – but in so far as it involves singling out individuals and treating them 
unfavourably on the basis of their personal characteristics or it has a worse effect on 
members of some disadvantaged group, it falls within the bounds of an intuitive 
understanding of the notion.3 Even those who resist the idea that everyday lookism 
involves appearance discrimination should concede that the acts that constitute it are 
sufficiently similar to discrimination that theories of what makes discrimination 
wrong (when it is wrong) are relevant to evaluating it from a moral point of view.4 
I shall consider various respects in which everyday lookism can be morally 
objectionable in virtue of the acts of wrongful discrimination it involves. I argue that 
these acts are wrongful when they are demeaning, or when they have unjust 
consequences whether singly or cumulatively.5 There are a number of ways in which 
they may have unjust consequences. First, the appearance norms in which these acts 
are rooted may be biased against various groups in such a way that the acts contribute 
to creating an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. Second, these acts may 
combine to make everyday lookism oppressive in virtue of impairing the personal 
autonomy of its victims or contributing to doing so. Third, these acts may be unjustly 
harmful in terms of their effects. I do not claim that my account captures all of the 
ways in which the acts of discrimination involved in everyday lookism may be 
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wrongful, but I hope to have identified the main ones. Nor do I claim that 
commenting upon the appearance of others is always wrongful. Indeed it may express 
a genuine concern for their well-being or be a permissible form of aesthetic criticism. 
Whether it is wrongful depends partly on its meaning in the context in which it takes 
place and partly on its effects.  
In addressing these issues, I shall regard an appearance norm as an informal 
rule concerning how one should look that is generally endorsed or, at least, generally 
followed within a society or a group.6 I shall treat the costs of compliance with an 
appearance norm, such as the time, effort, and use of resources involved in doing so, 
and the costs of non-compliance, such as the disapproval or moral criticism to which 
non-compliers are subjected and the feelings of guilt or shame they experience, as 
extrinsic to the norm rather than constitutive of it.7 In some but not all cases, the 
content of an appearance norm is central to explaining why the everyday lookism it 
fuels is morally objectionable. When the discrimination involved in everyday lookism 
is demeaning, the content of appearance norms plays a key role in explaining why it is 
wrongful, but when it is objectionable because it is oppressive or harmful, then the 
content of these norms is less important in explaining its wrongfulness than the costs 
of compliance and non-compliance with the norms. In cases when the discrimination 
is wrongful because it is shaped by biased norms, then both the content of these norms 
and the costs of compliance and non-compliance with them play a crucial role in 
explaining its wrongfulness.  
  The acts of discrimination shaped by appearance norms may be either 
contingently wrong, that is, wrong in virtue of their causal effects, or non-
contingently wrong, that is, wrong independently of their causal effects. Note that it is 
conceptually possible for an act to be non-contingently wrong without being 
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intrinsically wrong. An act is non-contingently wrong if and only if it is wrong 
independently of its causal consequences, whereas it is intrinsically wrong if and only 
if it is wrong solely in virtue of its intrinsic or constitutive properties, that is, 
properties that it has independently of its relationships with other things. It is therefore 
conceptually possible for an act to be non-contingently but extrinsically wrong, for 
example, an act might be non-contingently wrong in virtue of the disrespect it 
involves, but its disrespectfulness, and therefore its wrongness, may depend upon the 
social meaning given to acts of that kind. 
 
1. Demeaning comments 
Everyday lookism may be morally objectionable because it is demeaning. The 
appearance norms that fuel it, and the context in which it takes place, may be such 
that it sends out a message that those to whom these norms apply, or those who fail to 
comply with these norms, are morally deficient. The idea that everyday lookism may 
be demeaning in this way can be developed by drawing upon Deborah Hellman’s 
account of what makes discrimination wrong when it is wrong. She in effect argues 
that discrimination is non-contingently wrong when it demeans the victims of it, 
where ‘[t]o demean is to treat another as not fully human or not of equal moral worth’ 
(Hellman, 2008: 35).8 A person can treat others as if they lack equal worth without 
intending to do so, and indeed without believing that they have less moral value, by 
discriminating against them in a way that, under the circumstances, expresses the 
attitude, or conveys the message, that they are inferior. Moreover, this can happen 
without the victims, or indeed any bystanders, regarding the behaviour as demeaning. 
The idea that everyday lookism is sometimes demeaning can be unpacked further by 
employing the notion of recognition respect (Darwall, 1977: 36-49). Everyday 
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lookism can fail to give recognition respect to some or all of its victims because it 
does not give appropriate weight to their standing as persons, in particular the value 
that they each have in virtue of their possession of the capacity (to some adequate 
level) to live their lives in their own way. It does so by failing to take into account the 
attitudes it expresses, or the message it conveys, in the particular social and historical 
context in which it takes place (Eidelson, 2015: Ch.3). 
Hellman maintains that in order to demean another person, you need to have 
sufficient power over her to be able to put her down or subordinate her through your 
actions. Given the power that men may possess over women, and the history of unjust 
treatment to which women have been subject, it would seem that everyday lookism 
can be demeaning in virtue of sending out a message about the inferiority of women, 
such as the message that women are mere objects of male sexual desire. When men 
make comments to women about their appearance in a way that is sexualised, then 
this seems to be demeaning in a society in which women have been treated as objects 
for men’s sexual use, for it may objectify women by reducing them to their bodies or 
body parts.9 So too women who are ridiculed for not removing body hair, and who are 
regarded as disgusting or dirty for letting it grow naturally, may be demeaned as a 
result of the attention it receives. More generally, everyday lookism fuelled by 
appearance norms that cast women as more superficial than men in virtue of the 
greater significance women are expected to attach to their appearance might be 
thought to treat women as having an inferior moral status (Bartky, 1997: 102).  
It is not easy, however, to find clear cases of demeaning discrimination rooted 
in appearance norms that do not involve some other kind of discrimination as well, 
such as (in the examples given) gender discrimination. But one potential class of cases 
involves the practice of “fat shaming”, which seems to denigrate people regarded as 
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seriously overweight. In a society in which people who are regarded as obese are 
treated not merely as aesthetically unappealing but as morally flawed because they are 
seen as lazy or lacking in self-control, they may become stigmatised, that is, marked 
out as inferior. When this happens, fat shaming is objectionable in part because it 
sends out the message that people who are obese are morally inferior. Another 
potential class of cases concerns facial disfigurements. Even when people with facial 
disfigurements are not the objects of prejudice, the non-rational reactions of others to 
their appearance, such as recoiling in shock or staring, may mark them out as inferior, 
with the consequence that negative comments about their appearance may be 
demeaning. 
Even though it is hard to demean someone over whom you lack power, is it 
impossible to do so? It might be thought that fat shaming is one way in which the less 
powerful can sometimes demean the more powerful. Consider, for example, 
employees joking about the size of their boss. Hellman might resist the idea that their 
behaviour could be demeaning. She wants to distinguish between mere disrespect, 
which may take the form of insults, and demeaning behaviour properly so-called 
(Hellman, 2008: 29, 36). Only the latter puts a person down in the relevant sense since 
merely disrespectful behaviour does not amount to treating a person as if they lacked 
equal moral worth. The difference between merely disrespectful and demeaning 
behaviour may lie not in the content of what is said but merely in the power relations 
that obtain. But even if fat shaming is demeaning only if the person who engages in it 
has power over the victim, that may not require the victim to be a member of some 
other disadvantaged group. For it may be that those regarded as obese are themselves 
a stigmatised group as a result of prejudices that are held about them and the 
treatment they receive, and that as a consequence a slim person may possess sufficient 
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power to demean a man who is obese even when she has less power along other 
dimensions, for example, when she is a female employee and he is the boss.  
Identifying the message conveyed by an act of discrimination involves 
interpreting the meaning of the act in the light of the past and present treatment of the 
group or groups to which the victims belong (Hellman, 2008: Ch.3). It might therefore 
be thought that when everyday lookism is wrong in virtue of acts of discrimination 
that are demeaning, then it must be contingently wrong since its wrongfulness 
depends upon the context in which these acts take place (Eidelson, 2015: 74). But 
here we can make use of the distinction between claiming that an act is non-
contingently wrong and maintaining that it is intrinsically wrong. If an act of 
discrimination is wrong in virtue of the demeaning message it conveys, then that 
would seem to make it extrinsically rather than intrinsically wrong, since its 
wrongfulness depends on the social and historical context in which it takes place. 
However, it would nevertheless be non-contingently wrong since its wrongfulness is 
independent of its causal consequences, because the message conveyed by the act 
does not depend upon that message being received or even understood by those who 
comply with the norm – those who are demeaned need not feel demeaned – or by 
those who participate in the practice of which it is part.  
2) Biased appearance norms 
Everyday lookism might seem wrongful when the appearance norms that shape it are 
biased against particular groups and it is costly not to comply with these norms. 
Consider two types of appearance norm that are biased in this way. First, norms that 
are gender-biased because they are harder or more costly for one gender to comply 
with compared to the other.10 These include gender-specific norms that make 
demands on one gender but not the other (for example, a norm compliance with which 
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requires women but not men to wear makeup, or a norm that excludes men but not 
women from wearing makeup), and gender-differentiated norms that make greater 
demands in various respects on one gender compared to the other (for example, norms 
governing weight, which require women to be thinner compared to men, and norms 
governing the wearing of brightly coloured clothing, which are more restrictive for 
men). When everyday lookism involves discrimination that is influenced by these 
norms, then it constitutes direct discrimination on the basis of gender. Second, norms 
that are racially-biased because in general they are easier and/or less costly for 
members of one racial group to comply with than for another, for example, a norm 
that regards cornrows or dreadlocks as messy, which may require many black or 
mixed race men and women to use harmful chemicals or purchase expensive straight 
hair extensions in order to comply with it. When everyday lookism involves 
discrimination that is influenced by these norms, then it constitutes indirect rather 
than direct discrimination on the basis of race in virtue of the worse effect it has on 
members of these racial groups, provided that those who engage in it do not do so 
because of their own racial biases.11  
Appearance norms may also sometimes be biased against those with certain  
disabilities, for example, norms that value symmetrical bodies or faces, or against 
some religious minorities, for example, dress codes that require women to wear skirts, 
or against people who are economically deprived, for example, norms with which it is 
expensive financially to comply. But I shall begin by focusing on gender-biased and 
racially-biased appearance norms because they are a good starting point for reflection. 
When everyday lookism is informed by gender-biased or racially-biased appearance 
norms, and makes it costly not to comply with these norms, why are the acts of 
discrimination that it involves wrongful? When it is costly not to comply with them, 
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gender-biased or racially-biased appearance norms might be regarded as unfair, and 
acts of discrimination shaped by them as non-contingently wrong, simply because 
they place unequal burdens on one gender compared to the other, or black people 
compared to white people. But why, exactly, is this unfair or wrongful? One possible 
response is that it is unfair or wrongful because some are being made worse off than 
others through no fault of their own. This seems to invoke a luck egalitarian principle 
of justice. But note that a luck egalitarian approach of this kind cannot justify the 
claim that these norms, and the acts of discrimination they shape, are unfair or 
wrongful simply in virtue of placing greater burdens on one gender or on a particular 
racial group. Luck egalitarians must allow that when racially-biased and gender-
biased appearance norms form the basis of discrimination, even if they make some 
worse off through no fault of their own in one respect, they do not necessarily make 
them worse off all things considered. As a result, from a luck egalitarian perspective 
appearance norms that place unequal burdens on different groups are fair provided 
that any involuntary disadvantage these norms create receives compensation, and 
therefore the acts of discrimination shaped by these norms are not intrinsically wrong. 
This does not seem to me to count against a luck egalitarian approach, 
however. It is not implausible to suppose that the problem with biased appearance 
norms lies in their overall consequences rather than in the mere fact that they make 
greater demands on one group compared to another and it is costly not to comply with 
them. I do not have the space to argue for a particular theory of distributive justice, 
and I shall not presuppose one in what follows. But it is clear that from the 
perspective of a variety of different theories, gender-biased and racially-biased 
appearance norms, and acts of discrimination rooted in them, are potentially a matter 
of concern from the point of view of distributive justice in virtue of contributing to 
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the creation of inequalities that have a morally problematic size, character or effect. 
Indeed, one way in which they may do is by adversely affecting those who have 
suffered wrongful discrimination in other contexts. When everyday lookism is fuelled 
by gender-biased or racially-biased appearance norms, it is likely to make the overall 
distribution of benefits and burdens more unjust, though that will depend to some 
degree on what redistributive policies are in place in a society and the particular 
theory of justice that is invoked. To the extent that women and minority racial groups 
are unfairly disadvantaged in other contexts, everyday lookism animated by gender-
biased or racially-biased appearance norms is likely to be morally objectionable, at 
least in part, because it makes members of these groups even worse off. In other 
words, it is likely to be contingently wrong in virtue of its unjust consequences.  
 As already noted, appearance norms may be biased in other ways. Those that 
are biased against people with particular disabilities, or against a religious minority, or 
against the economically deprived, may also contribute to creating or worsening 
unjust inequalities. Many appearance norms are what might be termed ‘naturally-
biased’ because, independently of whether they are biased in other respects, they 
place greater demands on those whose appearance is, as a result of their physical 
nature, further away from the ideal that the norm specifies, that is, whose genes or 
biological makeup mean that it is harder and/or more costly for them to comply with 
the norm. Some are born with the potential to acquire the looks that these norms prize 
without needing to make much effort or incur many costs, for example, some boys are 
born with the potential to become tall, and thus in later life (assuming adequate 
nutrition and nothing untoward happens to them) they will fare better when judged 
against a norm that regards tall men as better-looking. When everyday lookism is 
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informed by naturally-biased appearance norms does it contribute to creating or 
worsening an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens?  
Luck egalitarians should have moral qualms about everyday lookism when it 
is fuelled by naturally-biased appearance norms on the grounds that the acts of 
discrimination it involves make some worse off than others through no fault of their 
own, at least in so far as those made worse off do not receive compensation for the 
disadvantages they suffer. There may also be reason for adherents to other theories of 
distributive justice to think that everyday lookism fuelled by naturally-biased 
appearance norms has unjust consequences. There is empirical evidence that 
significant economic benefits flow to people who are regarded as more attractive. 
There are sex differences here, but men and women regarded as attractive earn 
considerably more over their lifetimes than those whose looks are rated as average, 
and men and women regarded as unattractive earn considerably less over their 
lifetimes than those who looks are rated as average.12 This evidence does not control 
for the effects of grooming or other measures that people take to conform to naturally-
biased appearance norms, and it does not distinguish between the effects of morally 
wrongful and morally permissible appearance discrimination in the context of 
employment decisions. But it provides grounds for thinking that those who are 
naturally better looking when judged against these norms are systematically being 
rewarded with economic benefits even if they are not the beneficiaries of wrongful 
discrimination, and the sizeable inequalities thereby created ought to be of concern 
from the point of view of theories of distributive justice that are committed to 
egalitarian principles or place demanding limits on what inequalities are just. In so far 
as everyday lookism rooted in naturally-biased appearance norms worsens the 
position of people who are wrongly disadvantaged on the basis of their appearance in 
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the context of employment decisions, it contributes to creating or exacerbating an 
unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. 
  
3) The oppressiveness of everyday lookism 
Everyday lookism might be thought to be wrongful on the grounds that it is 
oppressive (Chambers, 2008: 88). But could everyday lookism be oppressive without 
being demeaning and without being fuelled by biased appearance norms, or does the 
charge that it is oppressive reduce to claims about the demeaning character of the acts 
of discrimination it involves, or to the way in which acts of discrimination rooted in 
biased appearance norms may contribute to the creation of an unjust distribution? If 
everyday lookism was fuelled by appearance norms that applied uniformly to 
everyone, did not adversely affect disadvantaged groups in an unequal way, and did 
not treat anyone as morally inferior, could it nevertheless be oppressive? 
 There are different theories of what it is for someone, or (more usually) some 
group, to be oppressed. But to say that a practice, such as everyday lookism, is 
oppressive is not the same as saying that those who are the victims of it are oppressed 
or members of an oppressed group. For example, it might coherently be claimed that 
everyday lookism rooted in appearance norms that require professional men to 
conform to rigid stands of dress and adornment that give little scope for creativity or 
self-expression is oppressive to them without supposing that they are an oppressed 
group. To avoid becoming mired in a debate about what is the best way of interpreting 
the claim that a practice is oppressive, I shall simply stipulate that a practice is 
oppressive if and only if it impairs the capacity of those who are the victims of it to be 
the authors of their own lives, that is, a practice is oppressive if and only if it impairs 
the autonomy of its victims. And I shall also stipulate that a practice impairs a 
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person’s autonomy if and only if it adversely affects his or her autonomy in such a 
way that it gives us at least a reason for regarding it as wrongful. A practice could in 
principle be oppressive in this sense even if it involved no race or gender bias, and 
even if it did not treat anyone as inferior in terms of their status. 13  
 I propose to explore the issue of how practices in general may impair 
autonomy to cast light on how everyday lookism in particular may do so.14 In order to 
illustrate the potential oppressiveness of practices, consider a society that has a strong 
work ethic. It operates with a norm compliance with which requires its members to 
work no less than twelve hours a day, take no more than a day off a week, and no 
more than a week’s holiday a year. As a result, its members work long hours and have 
little leisure time, even though they would not be dismissed if they worked seven hour 
days, took two days off a week, and had a month’s holiday a year. Compliance with 
the norm is burdensome not only in terms of the effort of will required to comply with 
it, but also in terms of the opportunities for leisure, self-development outside of the 
work environment, and participation in family life, that are foregone as a result. But 
non-compliance with the norm is burdensome too. Other members of society act 
disapprovingly towards those who take more time off than the norm permits, 
sometimes shunning them completely, openly criticising their behaviour, and more 
generally regarding them as failing in their obligation to make an adequate 
contribution to society.  
 Members of this society internalise the norm through a process of socialisation 
and habituation. As children, they are encouraged to devote most of the hours they are 
awake to schoolwork as a preparation for their working lives. When they become 
young adults, they are praised when they comply with the norm and criticised when 
they fail to do so. As a result of internalising the norm, they gain pleasure from 
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complying with it and feel guilty if they take more time off than it permits.15 For 
some, the norm even becomes part of their identity, and their capacity to reflect upon 
its role in their lives and in their society may be limited. Many of those who 
internalise the norm endorse it. They may think that it is good that society is governed 
by it. They may think that they have a moral duty to others to comply with it, perhaps 
even an unconditional obligation to do so, that is, a duty to comply with it regardless 
of how others behave. They may think that a life of hard work is the only way of 
achieving personal fulfilment. They may experience feelings of pleasure when they 
comply with it, and suffer feelings of guilt when they fail to comply with it, as a result 
in part of endorsing the norm. Others who internalise the norm may nevertheless 
reject it because they regard it as bad for their society or for them, but they may still 
gain pleasure from complying with it, and feel guilty when they take time off, as a 
residual effect of the process of socialisation and habituation that they have 
undergone.  
 The practice in which this norm is embedded seems oppressive, at least if we 
assume it is not a justifiable moral norm even though many in the society I have 
described may treat it as if it were.16 (If it were a justifiable moral norm, then the 
practice would not impair personal autonomy even when the costs of complying with 
the norm, and the costs of not complying with it, were high, because it would not 
adversely affect autonomy in a way that gives us a reason to regard it as wrongful. 
Compliance with the norm might be morally required in circumstances where, for 
example, the worst off were below the level at which they could lead decent lives and 
adherence to it was necessary in order to bring them up to that level. But I shall 
assume that these are not the circumstances that obtain in the case I have described.) 
The practice seems to be oppressive, even though the norm is not enforced by 
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employers, and even though those who are subject to it are not physically prevented 
from taking more time off, and indeed would not be sacked from their jobs if they did 
so. Furthermore, the practice seems to be potentially oppressive even for people who 
endorse the norm and criticise others for failing to live up to it.17 Let me consider why 
this practice threatens autonomy in such a way that there is a moral reason for 
objecting to it. 
 The processes of socialisation and habituation through which a norm is 
internalised may undermine (or contribute to undermining) an agent’s capacity 
adequately to reflect upon that norm and decide whether she should seek to comply 
with it, for example, these processes may result in her being unable to stand back 
from the norm and question it, or they may involve shielding her from relevant 
information concerning the risks involved in complying with it. But even when they 
do not undermine (or contribute to undermining) her capacity to stand back from a 
norm and subject it adequately to critical scrutiny, the practice in which it is 
embedded may nevertheless adversely impact upon her autonomy in other ways. 
When the costs of complying or not complying with a norm are high, the practice may 
negatively affect her exercise or development of autonomy in one or more respects.  
First, if she endorses the norm because she mistakenly regards it as a correct 
moral norm that spells out what she owes to others, then it may adversely affect her 
capacity to pursue her own projects effectively, perhaps by reducing the time and 
energy that she has available to do so after complying with it, or by limiting her 
opportunities for creativity and self-expression. So even though acting in accordance 
with the norm may be regarded as an exercise of her autonomy, at the same time her 
pursuit of her own conception of the good is inhibited in a way that compromises her 
autonomy.  
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Second, even if she endorses the norm as part of her own conception of how to 
live conceived independently of what she owes to others (for instance, she believes 
that personal fulfilment comes through hard work), the practices in which it is 
embedded might seriously inhibit her capacity to pursue a revised conception in the 
future should she change her mind. She may face high costs associated with rejecting 
the norm, for example, anger from friends or family who might even regard her 
rejection of it as a betrayal of them and ostracise her as a result. More generally, the 
high costs of non-compliance with it may set back her interest in being able to pursue 
a revised conception of how to live should she decide to do so.  
Third, when she does not endorse the norm, it may be very costly for her not 
to comply with it, and in some cases she may be forced to abide by a conception of 
how to live that she rejects: the norm may express that conception and the costs of 
non-compliance with it may be so great that she has no reasonable choice but to 
comply with it.  
Whether the costs of compliance or non-compliance with a norm impair a 
person’s autonomy depends on whether the extent and nature of these costs adversely 
affect her capacity to pursue her own conception of how to live in such a way that 
there is a moral reason for objecting to that norm and the practice in which it is 
embedded. These costs can be divided into those that are in some sense external to the 
subject, for example, the opportunities of which she is deprived, and those that are 
internal to her, that is, burdensome mental states such as painful experiences or 
feelings of guilt. It would seem that external costs of non-compliance are always 
relevant for determining whether a social practice involving a norm impairs the 
autonomy of those subject to it. But what about the internal costs of non-compliance, 
such as the guilt that would be felt as a result of non-compliance, and indeed the 
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internal costs of compliance, such as the pain experienced as a result of the physical 
exertion that is needed for compliance? When can internal costs such as these 
legitimately be taken into account when judging whether a practice is oppressive?  
There is a clear case for holding that when a person rejects or, at least, does 
not endorse, a social norm (that is, she regards it either as an objectionable norm or as 
simply “one of the rules of the game”), but she nevertheless experiences feelings of 
shame and guilt when she doesn’t comply with it, and she cannot get rid of these 
feelings or can do so only with great difficulty, then these costs should count in 
determining whether her autonomy is impaired. When these feelings are the product 
of the processes of socialisation and habituation that she has experienced, and persist 
even though she rejects the norm, then they potentially contribute to making the 
practice in which that norm is embedded oppressive for her.  
But what about the internal costs that may result from her endorsing the norm, 
for example, from regarding it as a good or justifiable norm because she thinks it is 
beneficial in some way or expresses a moral requirement? Suppose for, example, that 
non-compliance is accompanied by feelings of guilt that arise only because she thinks 
that she ought to comply with it. It would seem that these costs cannot legitimately be 
taken into account when making judgements about whether a practice impairs her 
autonomy, that is, in making judgements about whether her autonomy is adversely 
affected in a way that gives us a moral reason to object to it, and indeed to take them 
into account is to fail to give due weight to her status of as an agent with a capacity to 
make her own judgements about what she should do, including whether she should 
endorse, and comply with, a social norm that applies to her, and experience the 
appropriate feelings that would flow from doing so. In effect, we should hold a person 
responsible for exercising her capacity to reflect upon the norm, and determine 
 19 
whether she should comply with it, by not taking into account the internal costs of 
failing to comply with it when she endorses it in judging whether the practice in 
which that norm is embedded impairs her autonomy, that is, whether the practice 
adversely affects her autonomy in a way that provides a moral reason to object to it, 
and therefore in judging whether the practice is oppressive for her.  
Partly because the internal costs of non-compliance with a norm count in 
determining whether a practice in which that norm is embedded is oppressive for a 
person only if she doesn’t endorse that norm, there is in one sense an irreducibly 
subjective aspect to judgements concerning whether a practice is oppressive: a 
practice might be oppressive for some of those whose behaviour it governs but not for 
others. These judgements are also subjective in part because the costs of compliance 
with a norm, both internal and external, may vary between people since less exertion 
or fewer resources may be required for some to comply with it than for others. 
Furthermore, the costs of non-compliance with a norm, both internal and external, 
may vary from one person to another depending on their psychological dispositions 
and whether their family, friends, and acquaintances are inclined to criticise them for 
non-compliance with it. 
 What implications does my analysis of how norms may be oppressive have for 
everyday lookism? It creates the basis for a strong case that everyday lookism impairs 
the autonomy of many people, especially women and especially young adults. In 
some extreme cases, everyday lookism may contribute to undermining a person’s 
capacity to reflect upon the norms that fuel it. Even when it does not do so, the costs 
of complying with these norms, and the costs imposed on non-compliers, are often 
very high. At least, that seems true when we consider the full set of appearance norms 
that spell out an ideal of what it is to look beautiful, even though it may be less 
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plausible in relation to particular appearance norms. If the acts of discrimination that 
are constitutive of everyday lookism impair autonomy, or contribute to impairing 
autonomy, then they are contingently wrong in virtue of doing so, that is, they are 
wrong because of their causal consequences.18  
 Consider the evidence. First, as documented by Widdows and others, some 
appearance norms are particularly demanding because the external costs of complying 
with them are very high. As the bar is raised for the “routine” beauty treatments that 
are required to meet minimum standards (Widdows, 2018: 107-119), the range of 
measures that individual women, and sometimes men, need to take in order to comply 
with appearance norms expands. Some of these treatments, such as extreme dieting or 
cosmetic surgery, may involve taking significant, even high, risks with respect to 
one’s health and future wellbeing, whether in the short term or the long term.  
 Second, there are high costs involved in failing to comply with appearance 
norms. The costs imposed by everyday lookism, such as the moral shaming that takes 
place, especially with respect to women but also in relation to men, can be very 
burdensome. For example, those who are regarded as overweight are accused of 
lacking self-discipline; women who fail to remove body hair are regarded as 
disgusting or unhygienic; women who are regarded as making insufficient effort with 
respect to their appearance are portrayed as letting themselves go, as failing in their 
duty to themselves, and sometimes as failing in their duty to others to be aesthetically 
appealing objects; men who paint their nails or wear makeup suffer ridicule and 
homophobic abuse. As a result, non-compliers may experience debilitating 
appearance anxiety, low self-esteem and low self-confidence. 19 In some such cases, it 
might seem that these psychological costs cannot justifiably be regarded as 
contributing to the impairment of the autonomy of those adversely affected because 
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they have the capacity to develop thicker skins to avoid being psychologically 
damaged, and it would be reasonable to expect them to do so. But that response is less 
plausible in the case of adolescents and young adults. Even when the costs of non-
compliance with an appearance norm are not actually very high, they may sometimes 
reasonably be believed to be high, for example, media images may convey the 
message to young women that they ought to be very thin rather than merely not 
overweight. In these cases, we might regard the perceived costs as contributing to 
making everyday lookism oppressive.  
A failure to comply with an appearance norm may even threaten a person’s 
status within a group or indeed a society. Being badly dressed according to the 
prevailing norms, for example, wearing worn-out clothes because one cannot afford 
new ones, may lead to being judged negatively by others in one’s society in a way 
that threatens one’s standing (Scanlon, 2018: 30-31). Merely being unfashionably 
dressed may within some groups lead to loss of status, that is, to being judged as less 
valuable than other members.  
 Third,  the external costs of compliance and non-compliance sometimes work 
together to create a double bind, especially for women. People may comply with 
demanding appearance norms that apply within their group or economic class in order 
to fit in and avoid being taunted, but face ridicule or shaming from those outside that 
group or from those who belong to a different economic class. For example, young 
women who dress in short skirts and apply makeup liberally in order to conform to 
the appearance norms in their group may be victims of “slut shaming” ; working class 
women who adopt the dress, makeup and hair styles characteristic of their economic 
class may be subject to ridicule or be taken less seriously in professional contexts that 
are governed by different appearance norms. 
 22 
When everyday lookism is oppressive for a person, it is objectionable, at root, 
because of the way it impairs her personal autonomy: either because it negatively 
affects her capacity to reflect upon the appearance norms that inform it and decide 
whether to comply with them, or because it compromises her ability effectively to 
pursue her current conception of how to live or to pursue a different one in the future 
should she revise it, or because it forces her to abide by a conception of how to live 
that she does not endorse. Compliance with these norms may reduce her appearance-
related opportunities for creativity or self-expression or reduce the time and energy 
that she has to pursue her own conception of how to live, whereas non-compliance 
with them may negatively affect her confidence in her ability to pursue that 
conception successfully as a result of feeling unattractive. The costs of non-
compliance may also force her to pursue an ideal of beauty that she does not endorse, 
and indeed from which she may feel alienated.  
 
4. The harmfulness of everyday lookism 
Even if a practice does not impair the autonomy of those affected by it, it may cause, 
or contribute to causing, physical or psychological harm to them. Consider again the 
society with the strong work ethic that I described earlier. Members of this society 
may suffer from illnesses as a result of work-related stress when they strive to comply 
with the norm. Similarly, the cosmetic procedures that some women undergo in 
seeking to make themselves more beautiful when judged against appearance norms 
may lead to serious health problems in the short or long term, even when there is no 
negligence on the part of those who perform these procedures.20 Those who don’t 
comply with the work ethic described may experience severe anxiety about their 
failure to do so, and feelings of guilt that they are not working as hard as others expect 
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and think they should. Similarly, people who do not comply with appearance norms 
may suffer from severe anxiety about their appearance as a result of everyday 
lookism, and they may be debilitated by lack of confidence and low self-esteem. But 
when does the physical or psychological harm that a person suffers as a result of 
seeking to comply with an appearance norm, or believing that her appearance falls 
short when judged against that norm, count as a wrong or an injustice that is done to 
her by everyday lookism and the acts of discrimination it involves? 
 In addressing this issue, we need to distinguish at least three different types of 
case. In each, I shall assume that the person concerned possesses an adequate capacity 
for critical reflection, unless I indicate otherwise. First, cases where the harm suffered 
by a person is such that she had no control over it: it was not a result of any decisions 
she made, and she could not have taken any steps to avoid that harm, for example, she 
could not have cultivated greater resilience in the face of the body shaming she 
experiences. Second, cases where a person has some control over the harm she 
suffers, for example, she could have taken steps to become more resilient in response 
to negative comments about her appearance, or chosen not to respond to the body-
image anxiety that she experiences by having risky cosmetic surgery that led to 
medical complications, but we couldn’t reasonably have expected her to do so, 
perhaps because of the level of that anxiety and its effect on her life, or the effort and 
will-power that would have been involved in overcoming it, or the maturity that 
would have been required. Third, cases when a person could have avoided the harm, 
or taken steps to avoid it, and it would not have been unreasonable to expect her to do 
so because the costs involved would not have been high.  
In practice, cases may be hard to classify. It is clear that children and 
adolescents who experience fat-shaming are generally unable to avoid the anxiety and 
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other adverse psychological effects it creates for them, or if they could do so, it would 
be unreasonable at their stage of development to expect them to cultivate greater 
resilience to the taunts they suffer, and they may not yet have developed to any great 
extent the capacities required to reflect critically on the practice of fat-shaming. But 
what about mature adults? When adults experience a serious loss of self-confidence or 
suffer severe anxiety as a result of casual comments such as ‘you’ve put on a bit of 
weight recently’ or ‘you need to be more careful with what you eat’, then even if we 
are confident that they could have developed a thicker skin, it is often unclear whether 
it is reasonable to expect them to do so. As a result, it is hard to know whether cases 
such as these fall into the second category or the third category. Context may make a 
big difference here: for example, it is reasonable to expect a person to develop a 
thicker skin when she is floored by a negative remark about her in the context of a 
supportive friendship, but not necessarily when it is made on social media by a 
stranger who intends it to have that effect. But we can at least describe clear cases that 
fall into the third category, even though there may be doubts about how often they 
occur in reality. For example, when a woman makes a decision to have a buttock 
enhancement, not because she is anxious about her body, or subject to taunts, but 
because one of her ambitions is to make herself more beautiful when judged against 
appearance norms that she endorses, but she ends up with health problems as a result 
of the risks she has consciously taken, without any negligence on the part of the 
surgeons who operated on her.  
When cases do fall into the third category, then it would seem that the harm 
suffered does not constitute an injustice that can be laid at the door of everyday 
lookism because it was reasonably avoidable. In cases that genuinely fall into this 
category, those who suffer harm possess an adequate capacity to reflect upon the 
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norm, and either the costs of not acting on it are low, or if they are high, then they are 
high as a result of internal costs that are due to her endorsement of the norm, rather 
than, say, the body-shaming of others. Just as internal costs that arise from a person’s 
endorsement of a norm do not count in making judgements about whether everyday 
lookism is oppressive to a person, that is, impairs her autonomy in a way that provides 
a moral reason to object to that practice, so too these costs are relevant to judging 
whether a harm that a person suffers as a result of everyday lookism could not 
reasonably have been avoided, and is therefore a wrong that is done to her by it, only 
if these costs do not arise from her endorsement of the appearance norms that fuel the 
practice. 
Clare Chambers holds the view that if a significant harm is caused by 
complying with an appearance norm, then that harm is an injustice whenever the only 
benefits derived from complying with the norm are a consequence of the norm’s 
being endorsed by the agent or by other members of her society (Chambers, 2008: 
175-177; 195-197). She builds her case through a discussion of breast implants. She 
points out that the damage caused to women’s health and well-being by this surgery, 
in both the short and longer term, are potentially high (Chambers, 2008: 187-191), 
and the benefits of complying with the relevant norms concerning breast size or shape 
are solely the product of widespread endorsement of these norms. Her account 
therefore yields the conclusion that the harms some women suffer as a result of breast 
enhancement surgery are an injustice to them. But Chambers’s view seems to have 
counterintuitive consequences.  
Consider a variant of the society with the work ethic, in which the productivity 
of workers decreases to such an extent that after a certain point there is no benefit in 
terms of increased productivity for the additional hours worked. Suppose again that in 
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this society there is a high risk to one’s health from compliance with the social norm 
that the ethic involves. Those who comply with the norm by working additional hours 
receive no extra pay, and indeed the only benefits they obtain from doing so are the 
result of the norm being endorsed by them and by others, for example, feelings of 
intense satisfaction at being perceived to have contributed to society by working hard 
or thinking that they have complied with their moral obligation to do so. Widespread 
endorsement of the norm is a product of being socialised to accept it and habituated to 
comply with it from an early age, though members of society also acquire and retain 
the ability critically to reflect upon the norm and its role in their society. But the costs 
of non-compliance are very low: although employers and managers may sometimes 
raise their eyebrows when employees leave early, and make the occasional negative 
comment to them privately, there is little or no public criticism or shaming of those 
who fail to comply with the norm, it does not affect their career prospects, and they 
merely experience mild feelings of anxiety and guilt as a result of their non-
compliance. It is not clear that under these circumstances those who do comply with 
the norm, and develop stress-related health problems as a result, are the victims of an 
injustice or wronged in any way.  
To say this is not to deny that the society would be better without such a 
strong work ethic. It is merely to insist that if an agent is harmed by compliance with 
the norm, or by attempting to comply with it, then that harm wrongs her only if the 
costs of non-compliance with it are relatively high or she lacks the capacity to reflect 
adequately on it. If she has the capacity to reflect adequately upon the norm, and the 
costs of non-compliance with it are low, then the harm she suffers does not wrong her 
since it was reasonably avoidable by her. Even if in some sense it would have been 
possible for a society to have adopted a less demanding norm, compliance with which 
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would have been easier for everyone, and those who complied with it or attempted to 
do so would not suffer any harm as a result, it would not follow that, by adopting the 
more demanding norm, people who suffer harm as a result of complying with it or 
seeking to do so have been treated wrongfully. So long as the costs of non-compliance 
are low, so that the harm is reasonably avoidable by them, they have no reasonable 
complaint against the harm they suffer. 
 My approach to assessing the justice or injustice of harms caused by breast 
implants is correspondingly different from that of Chambers, though how far my 
conclusions diverge from hers in practice will depend on empirical facts that are not 
readily accessible. Perhaps for some individual women who seek this surgery, the 
combined internal and external costs of not acting on the relevant norms concerning 
breast size and shape would be relatively low. According to my view, in these cases, 
provided the women concerned are aware of the risks and have an adequate capacity 
to reflect upon the norm, even if they give less weight to these risks than they should, 
there is no wrong suffered by them if they are harmed as a result of this surgery. But 
for many women who seek breast enhancement surgery – perhaps the vast majority – 
the costs of not complying with the relevant norms would be high, for example, some 
suffer from serious anxiety or a debilitating lack of self-confidence because they 
believe that their breasts are too small or the wrong shape when judged against that 
norm. In these cases, there may be good reason to suppose that the victims are 
wronged by the harms they suffer as a result of opting for surgery because these 
harms were not reasonably avoidable. According to the view I am defending, 
however, their anxiety or lack of confidence counts as a relevant cost in determining 
whether the harms they suffer are reasonably avoidable only if it is not wholly a 
product of their endorsement of the relevant appearance norm.21 Unless their anxiety 
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or lack of self-confidence is caused by factors that are at least partly independent of 
their endorsement of the norm, for example, body-shaming by others, then it should 
not count in determining whether those harms were reasonably avoidable. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
I have argued that the acts of discrimination involved in everyday lookism can be 
non-contingently wrong because they are demeaning. When we take into account the 
costs of complying and not complying with the norms that fuel the practice, and the 
processes of socialisation that lead to the norms being internalised, these acts may (in 
addition or instead) be contingently wrong because they contribute to impairing the 
autonomy of those adversely affected. Everyday lookism may also be contingently 
wrong because of the harm it causes, such as mental health problems that are rooted in 
body anxiety, or physical harms that result from trying to improve one’s appearance, 
including the side-effects of undertaking risky cosmetic procedures. Furthermore, 
everyday lookism may be contingently wrong because the biased norms that shape it 
may contribute to the creation of objectionable inequalities.  
People may have an aesthetic or other interest in commenting upon the 
appearance of others, and depending upon the context and the manner in which it is 
done, there may be nothing morally problematic about it. Even when it is morally 
objectionable, the outcomes generated by those striving to comply with the norms that 
are embedded in everyday lookism may not all be bad. Widdows points out that the 
pleasure that people may gain from their attempts to do so, together with the creativity 
that may be involved, and the feelings of solidarity they may enjoy from sharing their 
experiences with others, may be of significant value (Widdows, 2018: 151-156; 185-
191). But the good that comes about in this way does not seem to outweigh the 
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wrongfulness that is often involved in the practices these norms govern and through 
which they are sustained.   
Nothing in my argument, however, supports the conclusion that appearance 
norms and the everyday lookism that they fuel are always morally problematic. The 
arguments I have developed apply against everyday lookism when it is demeaning, or 
oppressive, or unjustly harmful, or contributes to creating an unjust distribution of 
benefits and burdens. It leaves conceptual space for at least two sorts of 
unobjectionable practices that may involve commenting negatively on the appearance 
of others but need not be demeaning or oppressive, or have other unjust 
consequences. Firstly, practices that involve norms that apply within a group that one 
can choose to join, in which people strive to comply with these norms and judge each 
other’s appearance on the basis of them, but where not joining (and indeed not joining 
any group of this kind) is costless. In effect these groups would provide an 
opportunity to be governed by a set of appearance norms as a way of defining or 
expressing oneself. Think here of the way in which people might choose, in the 
absence of any peer-group pressure, to lead a goth or punk lifestyle, dressing in a way 
that expresses that identity. Secondly, practices that involve norms that apply to 
everyone but which are not demeaning nor oppressive (because the costs of 
complying with these norms and of not complying with them do not impair anyone’s 
autonomy), and which do not contribute to creating an unjust distribution of benefits 
and burdens, for example, appearance codes governing the attendance of funerals that 
specify clothing that is readily available and not costly to acquire. In sum, the 
legitimate complaints we have against everyday lookism leave space for a society in 
which there is a diversity of appearance norms, and some choice about which to 
endorse and through which potentially to express one’s identity or exercise one’s 
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creative powers – and indeed the choice, to some extent, of simply ignoring these 
norms altogether.  
In my view, this is an appealing vision but it is compatible with a society that 
places what we might justifiably regard as far too much weight on people’s 
appearance, and in which we think appearance norms are insufficiently inclusive 
because, for some, it is impossible, or difficult or costly, for them to conform to these 
norms, even though the norms are not oppressive to them because the costs of non-
compliance, and the costs of attempting to comply, are insufficient to lead to an 
impairment of their autonomy. I agree that societies are better when they place much 
less weight on appearance than happens in our own, and when the appearance norms 
that apply in them are inclusive. Furthermore, it may well be the case that the best 
way in practice of countering the oppressiveness of everyday lookism in the societies 
in which we live will include working individually and collectively to make 
appearance norms more inclusive. But in principle a society in which there are non-







                                                 
Notes 
1 For the notion of everyday lookism, see 
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/public-affairs/policy-
briefings/2019/everyday-lookism.aspx , accessed 27 November 2020. For the idea of 
lookism more generally, see Minerva (2017) and Liu (2017). 
2 See Widdows (2018: 26-35). Widdows claims that this ideal of beauty now has 
global reach, though she allows that there may be some cultural variations, for 
example, with respect to how, exactly, the constituents are understood, or with respect 
to additional ingredients (Widdows, 2018: Ch. 3). Indeed, her claim is consistent with 
local variations in appearance norms, for example, different groups within a society or 
indeed a region may adopt different norms concerning how one should dress, or 
adhere to different norms with respect to tattoos or piercings. 
3 According to the intuitive understanding with which I am working, A discriminates 
against P directly if and only if A treats P less favourably than Q because P has some 
property C that Q lacks, where Q is an actual or possible person, whereas A 
discriminates against P indirectly if and only if P is a member of a socially salient 
group G and P behaves in a way that disadvantages members of G compared to 
members of other socially salient groups, even though A is not biased against 
members of G. These analyses require refinement but they nevertheless capture our 
ordinary notions in a rough and ready way. According to them, there is no automatic 
inference from the fact that an act is discriminatory to the conclusion that it is even 
pro tanto wrong. For a more nuanced analysis of these concepts, see Lippert-
Rasmussen (2014: Chs. 1-2). 
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4 Might it be better to conceive of the acts that constitute everyday lookism as 
microagressions, and draw upon an account of what makes microagression wrong? 
Many cases of everyday lookism don’t seem to count as microagressions in Emily 
McTernan’s sense, for those who make negative remarks about the appearance of 
others are often aware that they will upset the people at the receiving end. 
Furthermore, there is at least a prima facie case for saying that some of the acts 
involved are morally objectionable even when the victims of them are not part of a 
marginalised or disadvantaged group, for example, when a middle-aged heterosexual 
white man is ridiculed for wearing makeup (McTernan, 2018: 261-281).  
5 In effect I draw upon a pluralist theory of what makes discrimination wrong (when it 
is wrong) that maintains that there are at least two potential sources of its 
wrongfulness, namely, the disrespect it may involve and its harmful consequences. In 
relation to the former, I have been influenced especially by Hellman (2008) and 
Eidelson (2015); in relation to the latter, I have been influenced especially by Lippert-
Rasmussen (2014: Ch. 6). Of these writers only Eidelson is a pluralist, however. For 
more on the distinction between pluralism and monism in theories of what makes 
discrimination wrong, see Moreau (2020: Ch. 5). 
6 I don’t intend this characterisation of an appearance norm to be a contribution to 
debates concerning the best way of understanding a social norm. It is formulated to 
leave open the possibility that an appearance norm might be sustained by a sizeable 
group of people complying with it even though they don’t endorse it and indeed think 
it is bad for the society or group to which they belong, that is, to make space for what 
Cristina Bicchieri calls ‘pluralistic ignorance’ (Bicchieri, 2017: 44). For a helpful 
discussion of the nature of norms to which I am indebted, see Brennan et al. (2013: 
Part 1). 
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7 This way of conceiving appearance norms has the plausible implication that the 
costs of complying and not complying with an appearance norm may change over 
time but do not affect its identity. 
8 In fact, Hellman regards demeaning discrimination as intrinsically wrong, but in my 
terms, for reasons that will become clear later on, her view is better characterised as 
the claim that demeaning discrimination is non-contingently wrong. 
9 For an analysis of how objectification of this kind amounts to a morally problematic   
denial of autonomy, see Langton (2009: Ch. 10). 
10 Here I mean costs in the broadest sense: not just financial costs, but also, for 
example, psychological costs and opportunities for self-expression foregone. 
11 When those who criticise the appearance of others on the basis of racially-biased 
norms do so because of their own racial biases, then they are engaged in direct racial 
discrimination. For a careful analysis of the concept of indirect discrimination and 
how it differs from direct discrimination, see, Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: Ch. 2). 
12 Daniel Hamermesh claims that, in the US, below average-looking women earn 4% 
less than average-looking women, whereas above-average looking women earn 8% 
more than those who are average looking. Below-average looking men earn 13% less 
than average-looking men, whereas above average looking men earn 4% more than 
average looking men. In other words, the overall beauty premium for good-looking 
women is 12%, whereas for men it is 17% (Hamermesh, 2011: 45-46). See also Liu 
and Sierminska (2014). 
13 Even though a practice can be oppressive even if it does not treat anyone as inferior 
and does not employ biased norms, if it lacks both these features, then it will not be 
discriminatory.  
 34 
                                                                                                                                            
14 Both Chambers and Widdows argue that assumptions are often made about the way 
in which choosing to participate in a practice renders the burdens involved in doing so 
just that make it hard to see how appearance norms of the kind I have been discussing 
could wrongfully impair individual autonomy (see Chambers, 2008: Ch. 5; Widdows, 
2018: Ch. 9). Like them, I reject the idea that “choice”, considered independently of 
the social context in which it is made, has a morally transformative effect, in the sense 
that outcomes that would otherwise be regarded as wrongful are automatically 
rendered just by it. My reflections on norm-governed practices in what follows are 
intended to explain why this is so. 
15 For his seminal discussion of the way in which power operates through the 
internalisation of social norms, see Foucault (1991).  Foucault’s insights have been 
developed by a number of feminist writers: see especially Bartky (1997) and 
Chambers (2008). 
16 I am assuming that the work ethic I have described is comprised of social norms. 
Brennan et al. propose that social norms are distinguished from moral norms in virtue 
of the fact that the justification of the former but not the latter makes an essential 
reference to social practices (Brennan et al., 2013: Ch. 4). Many of those who comply 
with the work ethic I have described see it as comprised of moral norms, so to treat it 
as a set of social norms has a debunking aspect. The same is true of appearance 
norms. As Widdows argues, many of those who comply with appearance norms 
regard them as moral norms (Widdows, 2018: 26-31), so to treat them as social norms 
is in effect to deny that they are moral norms. Others may regard appearance norms as 
aesthetic norms. Depending on how we understand aesthetic norms, it may be that to 
treat appearance norms as social norms is in effect to deny that they are aesthetic 
norms. 
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17 This raises a question that goes beyond the scope of the article, namely, who can 
justifiably be held responsible for the oppressiveness of a norm? An adequate answer 
to this question would need to acknowledge that responsibility is dispersed and may 
come in degrees. Individuals may incur some responsibility for the oppressiveness of 
a norm simply by conforming to it, but those who criticise or shame others for not 
complying with it incur a higher degree of responsibility, as may celebrities, and 
“influencers” on social media, when they endorse and comply with demanding 
appearance norms.  
18 We might nevertheless say that the practice of everyday lookism, made up of these 
acts together with the costs they impose on others, is non-contingently wrong in virtue 
of the way in which it impairs autonomy. 
19 For relevant evidence and discussion, see Grogan (2016). For evidence of body 
dissatisfaction and its impact in the UK, see Government Equalities Office (2014). 
For evidence from the US, see Bucchianeri et al. (2013: 1-7). The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics report (2017: 1.6-1.11), provides a good summary of the empirical evidence 
on appearance dissatisfaction.  
20 So too there may be health risks associated with cosmetics and the use of drugs as 
aids for dieting. See Rhode (2010: 35-40). 
21 There might nevertheless be good paternalistic and non-paternalistic reasons for 
regulating, or even prohibiting, breast enhancement surgery, even if it were the case 
that those harmed by it are not wrongfully harmed. 
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